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This engaging and provocative volume examines a precarious phenomenon
for republics: citizens’ ambition to rule, which Jeffrey A. Becker argues poses
inherent challenges to democratic equality yet is also “a necessary feature of
democratic politics” (xi). Becker’s interest is not merely the ambition of rulers
but the ambition of citizens for society. This is an ambitious topic, and this
book, while raising important questions, does not address them satisfactorily.
Its freely alternating perspective between the ambitions of rulers and those
of citizens creates conceptual confusions, while its substantive treatment of
topics like The Federalist is frequently cursory and questionable, conducted at
a step of remove through commentary on or quotations of secondary litera-
ture rather than direct engagement with the subject matter under consider-
ation.
The essential problem that preoccupies Becker is how the regime can cul-
tivate what he calls “healthy” forms of ambition, “where citizens seek public
office because they revere the norms of democratic government” (8), a task
complicated by Americans’ ambivalence on the subject. Some ambition, he
notes, is necessary, yet Americans have come to regard public ambition as
antidemocratically elitist at the same time that they have “become disillu-
sioned by democratic practices[, seeing] their civic principles as hollow or stag-
nant because of corruption,” the result of which is inflated and unattainable
expectations for politics: “Citizens’ ambitions outstrip their politics’ ability to
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satisfy those ambitions” (10–11). The apparent thesis—somewhat obscured,
again, by this alternation between citizens’ and leaders’ aspirations—is that
citizens need healthy ambition in order to identify and cultivate leaders with
healthy ambition.
Becker finds early American forms as expressed in both Puritanism and The
Federalist wanting in this regard. He characterizes the Puritans as holding
“shared ambitions for moral perfection” (20). Their “experience shows the
danger posed to democracy when people assume they can infallibly divide
one another into exclusive groups based on those who do and those who do
not belong to a moral community” (21). All this is based on an unsatisfying
treatment of John Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity”—an odd be-
ginning point, since the Mayflower Compact would have supplied a more ex-
plicit and temporally prior model of self-government—in which Becker quotes
only a few sentences of the original and far more of commentary on it. Given
this cursory treatment, the precise contours of Becker’s objection to Winthrop
are unclear. He characterizes the Puritan leader as believing that “governing
authority was not morally neutral. To unite people in the redeeming undertak-
ing of building a moral community means that people must give their loyalty
and devotion to some principles rather than others” (23). But surely this is true
of any coherent community. Becker seems to believe the Puritans simply went
too far, obliterating natural shades of moral gray in favor of rigid and exclu-
sionary distinctions. What is unclear, though, is why this is attributable at a
theoretical level to the moral distinctions he identifies in Winthrop.
Becker characterizes The Federalist as suspicious of ambition and, indeed,
neglectful of the cultivation of the ambition that a republic needs. Underlying this
analysis is the Anti-Federalist refrain, synthesized by Wilson Carey McWilliams,
that Publius’s regime is inattentive to the higher goods of politics. The Federalist
Becker argues, “expresses a hostility toward political leadership that precludes
the development of forums for educating citizens’ ambitions, a hostility Ameri-
can suspicion of power and authority sustains” (45). Similarly, The Federalist
“institutionalizes a political climate inherently hostile to forms of leadership
that might deviate from the ‘will of the people’” (55). But there are multiple
problems with this analysis. One is that, in the passage from Federalist 10 to
which Becker is elsewhere attentive but does not reconcile with his claim here,
Publius does assign representatives a central role in “refin[ing] and enlarg[ing]
the public views.” The papers on the Senate and the presidency (62, 63, 68, etc.)
similarly talk about leadership. Second is that the national government was
never intended to be a comprehensive politeia. It was rather established for
specific purposes, with the bulk of political community remaining at the state
and local levels. The system can perhaps be faulted for this, but within its self-
understanding, it is not deficient for failing to provide all elements of politi-
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cal health by the hand of the state. Not all of them are necessary for the
explicit purposes of the national government, and not all of them are absent
simply because the national government has not provided them. Finally,
Becker seems to channel Anti-Federalists but provides no substantive foun-
dation for his assertion, which Madison explicitly disclaims, that “The Fed-
eralist remakes the political community at the national level” such that “citi-
zens no longer look to their state governments as the locus of ambition for
political power; the new constitutional order assumes that position” (54).
Here again, the engagement with the text under consideration occurs largely
at arm’s length via either generalized assertions or quotation of the commentar-
ies of others, so it is difficult to assess Becker’s textual basis for such questionable
claims as that “The Federalist structures the republic so the institutions of gov-
ernment control the dangers of faction” (42). In fact Federalist 10 supplies no
such structure and discusses no such institutions. It merely observes that the em-
pirical conditions of an extensive republic naturally inhibit majority factions.
Elsewhere, Becker attributes to Madison the view “that Americans concern
themselves only with success and not the lofty ambitions that would elevate
humanity” (51). Perhaps Madison holds this view, but it would be easier to
evaluate whether he does were the claim linked to a specific textual citation
rather than merely asserted.
Becker’s chapter on the attractions but ultimate pitfalls of Jacksonian de-
mocracy is more successful but still suffers from the impulse toward ques-
tionable generalization, as in the following claim contrasting a competitive
and therefore apparently antipolitical commercial economy with a communal
agricultural one: “In a commercial society, some people profit because others
lose or do not profit” (68). Similarly, such sweeping and hardly self-evident
claims as the following synopsis of democracy beg for more analysis: “Even
as the ambition to get ahead materially appeared further and further out of
reach, citizens drew self-respect from working together to resolve common
problems rather than appealing to charity. These are the core democratic
ideals of self-government” (70).
This is one conception of democratic ideals—perhaps defensible even if un-
defended here—and it helps to explain Becker’s curious, intriguing but ul-
timately unconvincing appeal to Franklin Roosevelt as a Tocquevillian model
of healthy democratic ambition. This chapter moves seamlessly and sometimes
confusingly between the aristocratic ambition of Roosevelt and the populist
ambition of his constituents. An instance of the latter is Becker’s claim that “for
Tocqueville, local political associations could inspire, cultivate, and offer a fo-
rum for expressing those—formerly aristocratic—ambitions for greatness” (80).
This is not quite Tocqueville’s argument about association, which he felt could
combat individualism but which he did not explicitly associate with greatness.
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The larger conceptual problem, which Becker acknowledges but does not
adequately treat, is that Roosevelt the great centralizer can hardly be seen as
the archetype of a Tocquevillian statesman. Becker nods toward this difficulty
a handful of times, then grants it a three-page section that never really resolves
the problem except to claim, rehabilitatively, that Roosevelt “sought to com-
bine politics with administration; he did not—like many progressives—dismiss
the give-and-take of political debate in favor of the ‘scientific management’ of
the public’s business” (98). Yet Roosevelt had said even as a candidate, in his
Commonwealth Club Address: “I want to speak not of politics but of gov-
ernment.”
The title of the chapter that includes Becker’s commentary on Roosevelt is
“The Ambition to Recover Democratic Excellence.” But it is unclear whose
excellence Becker means. The democratic ambition of which he seems to speak
is that of participation and the taming of corporate power: all fair enough, but
it is not evident that this is related to excellence, which requires not the
challenge of others but the challenge of oneself. Becker’s concluding chapters,
which take citizens to task for failing to do precisely that, succeed better. Our
mistrust of ambition has, for example, caused us to adopt “a selection system
[for candidates] that often filters out all but the most ambitious candidates,
whose ambition is often loosely connected to established political practices
and associations” (103). We select candidates who present themselves as above
party and compromise, morally pure, and ideologically strident. “The success
that accrues to individual political ambition in America teaches a dangerous
lesson for democratic politics: that the individual can get ahead politically by
using other citizens instrumentally to achieve personal ambitions” (131).
Becker closes with important observations about the hunger for and costs of
cult-of-personality politics. “Citizens who develop more of a personal iden-
tification with presidential candidates and their administrations see the pres-
ident as relieving them of their own responsibility for self-government” (147).
One only wishes the incisive reflections with which the book is capped had been
placed atop a sturdier edifice.
Greg Weiner, Assumption College
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